Since the birth of the modern Republic of India, its future has always faced two paths: greatness or collapse. Recently, seventy-one years after its conception, modern India has been following the path of greatness and has been stepping on to the stage as a power in the East alongside of China and Japan and as a new world power. Along with its growing station in the world is a growing national ambition that includes its space program and space strategy.

India’s space ambitions over the years have been guided by the vision of India’s space program founder, Vikram Sarabhai. He stated that vision as “There are some who question the relevance of space activities in a developing nation. To us, there is no ambiguity of purpose. We do not have the fantasy of competing with the exploration of the moon or planets of manned space-flight. But we are convinced that if we are to play a meaningful role nationally, and in the community of nations, we must be second to none in the application of advanced technologies to the real problems of man and society.” [28]

“Space is used extensively in India’s social and development sector, with at least 60 departments using space services to pursue the country’s development agenda. Space technology can affect the most fundamental change in the ground rules of economic competitiveness and development. Space technology applications have served national development well. India’s space program is self-reliant and has also been providing launch services to foreign countries. India is now capable of placing four tonnes in orbit. India has achieved self-reliance in launch vehicles and satellite technology. Furthermore, there is immense potential of lunar resources for energy generation and the possibility of lunar bases, which is also beginning to see competitive attempts in Asia and in other regions. Space-related assets are exceptionally useful for military purposes. For example, ballistic missile defense cannot function without space assets providing communications and navigation. Apart from these, disaster management and tackling natural calamities are also important applications of space assets. India’s space policy should also energize competitive industries to participate in domestic and global markets with increased entrepreneurship in launch vehicles and satellite manufacturing segments. At the same time, efforts must be made to clean up space debris, which is already a huge challenge to keeping space safe, secure, and sustainable. Space assets need to be protected for supporting civil space functions and national security objectives.” [29]

But, in recent years there has been a shift in this ambition. In 2013, the Indian Navy launched its first dedicated military satellite GSAT-7. This launch created an independence of the Indian Navy away from Inmarsat which had provided communication services to its ships. [30]

GSAT-6, another dedicated military satellite, was launched in August 2015, to provide secure and quality communication its military. India further reinforced its military communication ability with the launch of GSAT-7A in December 2018. In April 2019, India launched EMISAT (Electro-Magnetic Intelligence Satellite) which was jointly developed by Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) and the Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO) in an effort to strengthen the military’s ability to intercept enemy radars by detecting the electromagnetic rays they emit. In addition to dedicated military satellites, the Indian military uses a number of dual-use satellites. [31]

The Indian Armed Forces have also been making institutional changes allowing them “to make better and efficient utilization of space in their military operations. In June 2010, Indian Defense Minister AK Anthony announced the establishment of Integrated Space Cell, under the Integrated Defense Services Headquarters of the Ministry of Defense. The Space Cell, jointly operated by the three services of the Indian military and the civilian institutions such as the Department of Space and ISRO, is meant to bring about better integration between these different agencies and evolve a more effective way of utilizing space for military purposes. The Cell is also supposed to review and assess possible threats to Indian space assets.” [32]

In March 2019, India announced and approved budget for a manned space mission in 2022. But the most controversial change occurred in March 2019, India conducted its first anti-satellite test. Code-named Mission Shakti, the anti-satellite interceptor ballistic missile destroyed a live Indian satellite in low Earth Orbit. [33] [34] This step has been taken in response to the growing Chinese economic and hard power capabilities in outer space, which they see as a direct threat to India’s national security. [35]

“Today the imperatives behind the Indian space program have evolved. Like many other countries, India is compelled to use space for a number of military requirements such as for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance. India is turning to space to gain operational and informational advantages. Space is the fourth dimension of warfare other than sea, air, and land. Nations are increasingly reorienting militaries to exploit the space domain.
“Space has several applications. Satellite communications, satellite imagery and reconnaissance, and satellite navigation perform numerous functions. For instance, satellite imagery enables damage assessment following an air strike and satellite navigation guides precision missiles to their targets. The global debate has moved from utilization of space for military purposes towards one of weaponizing outer space.

“China’s space program is militarily oriented and controlled by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). In 2015, China undertook major institutional reforms and created the PLA Strategic Support Force (PLASSF), integrating cyber, electronic, and space capabilities into a single unified service. With the support of its space assets, China has created a potent Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR). These measures are the result of China identifying space as the new strategic high ground. The establishment of the PLASSF is indicative of Beijing’s intention to exploit space as a pivotal asset for the conduct of military operations.

“India is confronted with a range of national security threats including proxy wars perpetrated by inimical neighbors, domestic insurgencies, left-wing extremism, natural disasters, and dangers along the Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs). Space will play a critical role for India in addressing these threats. Given the sheer geographic spread of India’s defense forces, space will be vital in helping them meet the threats the country faces. Space is vital for sustaining communications, logistics, missiles launch and guidance, weapons systems, and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) across the Indian Armed Forces.

“At the same time, opportunities for developing a space nexus also exist in India’s neighborhood. Pakistan is seen as a proxy space power of China.  Military collusion between the two will extend to increasing battlefield awareness and transparency, assist in acquiring precision coordinates, and prioritizing targets. China’s Anti-Satellite test (ASAT) in January 2007 demonstrated the intent behind China’s moves to acquire a potent space weapons capability.  India conducted its own ASAT test on 27 March 2019 but as mentioned earlier, New Delhi could not have ignored the trends of space weaponization including in the Indian neighborhood.” [36]

The shifts above and the continued direction of Inda’s space program and space strategy are being driven, as Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan wrote, “are genuine security-driven considerations for India and other Asian powers in shaping their space programs. Outer space is becoming an extension of the terrestrial geopolitical competition, with all participating.” [37] There is a techno-nationalism growing in Asia based on prestige and economic potential through space exploration and economic leverage through space denial which threatens the future of Asia and the International Community.

[28] “Critical Shifts in India’s Outer Space Policy”, Goswami, Namrata and Garretson, Peter. The Diplomat, April 16, 2019
[29] “India in the final frontier: Strategy, policy and industry”, Rajagopalan, Rajeswari Pillai, Mohan, Pulkit, and Krishna, Rahul, Observer Research Foundation, This special report is a by-product of the discussions and deliberations that took place at the 5th ORF Kalpana Chawla Annual Space Policy Dialogue. The dialogue took place from 29 April to 1 May 2019 in New Delhi.
[30]“India Space Strategy: Geopolitics is the Driver”, Rajagopalan, Rajeswari Pillai, Italian Institute for International Political Studies, December 11, 2020.
[31] “India Space Strategy: Geopolitics is the Driver”
[32] “India Space Strategy: Geopolitics is the Driver”
[33] “Critical Shifts in India’s Outer Space Policy”
[34] “India in the final frontier: Strategy, policy and industry”
[35] “India Space Strategy: Geopolitics is the Driver”
[36] “India in the final frontier: Strategy, policy and industry”
[37] “India Space Strategy: Geopolitics is the Driver”

To see the introduction to this series: Views of the International Game of Space Strategy Part 2: China's Space Strategy

Russia’s space program has long been a platform of its leadership on the international stage. An original pioneer into the space age since its launch of the first artificial satellite, Sputnik-1, and the first person in space, Yuri Gagarian, it became relied upon to send supplies and personnel to the International Space Station for a decade when the United States had stopped launching missions from its own soil. Since its conception, the Russian Space Program is robust, but unlike China’s it is not as well funded and much more focused.

Over the last two decades, Russia has been developing an arsenal of space denial (or counterspace) weapons. These weapons include electronic warfare capabilities “to deny, degrade, and disrupt communications and navigation and [Directed Energy Weapons] to deny the use of space-based imagery.” [19] In late 2019, Russia tested the Kosmos anti-satellite weapon. The Kosmos-2542 carried the smaller satellite Kosmos-2543 sub-satellite, like a matryoshka doll, which reportedly has buzzed Low Earth Orbit US spy satellites and launched a projectile into orbit at a relative high speed of 500 miles per hour, which has led to concerns about the potential Russian capability to target foreign satellites.[20] Also, Western Intelligence also has reason to believe that Russia has developed ground-based weapons designed to kill satellites. [21]

To understand the space strategy that Russia is pursuing it is important to remember that “[s]imilar to China, Russia supports space arms control agreements to prevent weaponization of space, even as it views space as a warfighting domain.” [22] As we explore the Russian doctrine for space, we need to examine the security threat they pose to Western powers: “The security threat posed by Russia is difficult for the West to manage as, in our view and that of many others, it appears fundamentally nihilistic. Russia seems to see foreign policy as a zero-sum game: any actions it can take which damage the West are fundamentally good for Russia. It is also seemingly fed by paranoia, believing that Western institutions such as NATO and the EU have a far more aggressive posture towards it than they do in reality. There is also a sense that Russia believes that an undemocratic ‘might is right’ world order plays to its strengths, which leads it to seek to undermine the Rules Based International Order – whilst nonetheless benefitting from its membership of international political and economic institutions. Russia’s substantive aims, however, are relatively limited: it wishes to be seen as a resurgent ‘great power’ – in particular, dominating the countries of the former USSR – and to ensure that the privileged position of its leadership clique is not damaged.” [23]

“Russia is not the only state investigating anti-satellite weaponry capabilities. There is a wider trend (e.g. China, India, US) to demonstrate advanced space capabilities with nefarious, if not directly offensive, intent. But, for the past few years, Russia in particular, has been provocative in testing its space weapon capabilities. [I]n April 2020, Russia launched and tested into low orbit the PL-19 Nudol direct-ascent anti-satellite (DA-ASAT) interceptor missile system from the Plesetsk Cosmodrome demonstrating its space assets with potential offensive capabilities, in particular, Russia’s capacity to destroy satellites in Low Earth Orbit.

“In addition, the satellites, Kosmos-2535 and Kosmos-2536, launched in July 2019, are also suspected to be operating beyond their official mission of studying Russian orbital assets. It is reported that these satellites conducted a close proximity activity, coming within one kilometer from each other, which led to the creation of orbital debris.” [24]

Russian Military thinkers and strategist believe that the importance of space will continue to expand and be a warfighting domain where achieving supremacy will be a decisive factor in winning future conflicts. In accordance, Russia is seeking to lead in the growing role of precision weapons and information networks in all types of conflicts. At the same time, Russia’s international political “chess moves” have been to express concern over the weaponization of space and purse binding space arms control agreements to box in what it sees as the US weaponization of outer space. All of these maneuvers are to strike what it sees as the United States “chink in their armor”, the reliance of the United States on space.

In pursuit of its space and counterspace strategy, Moscow reorganized its military and civilian space programs in 2015. It created the “Aerospace Forces by merging the former Air Force and Aero-space Defense Troops. This new force includes Russia’s space forces, who have the mission to conduct space launches and maintain the ballistic missile early warning system, the satellite control network, and the space surveillance network. The defense minister stated the change was “prompted by a shift in the center of gravity... towards the aerospace sphere” and as a counter to the U.S. Prompt Global Strike doctrine.” [25] In the process, Russia has reorganized its civil space program to correct inefficiencies across its space industry and to place that space industry almost exclusively into the ownership of the State.

With this reorganization, Russia is updating and improving its space launch capabilities to enhance reliability, alleviate environmental concerns, increase manufacturing efficiencies, and support future human spaceflight and deep-space exploration missions, [26] including the upgrading of the rocket lift capabilities. It is also looking to enhance its satellite communication system, which is essential not only to its civilian communication capabilities but also its military communication capabilities. Russia lags behind China and the United States in the number of satellites, but its high-resolution imagery, navigation, ballistic missile early warning, electronic intelligence satellites have a higher capability than China’s. [27] Currently, according to Western Intelligence agencies, Russia’s counterspace capabilities include:

• “Space Situational Awareness: Russia’s space surveillance network, composed of a variety of telescopes, radars, and other sensors, is capable of searching for, tracking, and characterizing satellites in all Earth orbits. This network allows Russia to support missions including intelligence collection, counterspace targeting, spaceflight safety, satellite anomaly resolution, and space debris monitoring. Some of these sensors also perform a ballistic missile early warning function.
• “Electronic Warfare: The Russian military views EW as an essential tool for gaining and maintaining information superiority over its adversaries, allowing Russia to seize the operational initiative by disrupting adversary command, control, communications, and intelligence capabilities. Russia has fielded a wide range of ground-based EW systems to counter GPS, tactical communications, satellite communications, and radars. Mobile jammers include radar jammers and SATCOM jammers. Russia has aspirations to develop and field a full spectrum of EW capabilities to counter Western C4ISR and weapons guidance systems with new technology, data transfer, and capabilities for peacetime and wartime use by 2020.
• “Directed Energy Weapons. Russia likely is pursuing laser weapons to disrupt, degrade, or dam-age satellites and their sensors. Prior to July 2018, Russia began delivering a laser weapon system to the Aerospace Forces that likely is intended for an ASAT mission. In public statements, Pres-ident Vladimir Putin called it a ‘new type of strategic weapon,’ and the Russian Defense Ministry asserted that it is capable of ‘fighting satellites in orbit.’ Russia is also developing an air-borne ASAT laser weapon system to use against space-based missile defense sensors.
• “Cyberspace Threats: Since at least 2010, the Russian military has prioritized the development of forces and capabilities, including cyberspace operations, for what it terms “information confrontation,” which is a holistic concept for ensuring information superiority. The weaponization of information is a key aspect of this strategy and is employed in times of peace, crisis, and war. Russia considers the information sphere to be strategically decisive and has taken steps to modernize its military’s information attack and defense organizations and capabilities.216
• “Orbital Threats: Russia continues to research and develop sophisticated on-orbit capabilities that could serve dual-use purposes. For example, inspection and servicing satellites can be capable of closely approaching satellites to inspect and potentially fix issues causing malfunctions; this same technology could also be used to approach another country’s satellite and conduct an attack that results in temporary or permanent damage. In 2017, Russia deployed what it described as an ‘inspector satellite capable of diagnosing the technical condition of a Russian satellite from the closest possible distance’; however, its behavior is inconsistent with on-orbit inspection activities or space situational awareness capabilities.
• “Ground-based Kinetic Energy Threats: Russia likely is developing a ground-based, mobile missile system capable of destroying space targets in LEO and ballistic missiles. This weapon system is likely to be operational within the next several years.” [28]

Next week we will continue to review various national space strategies by examining India’s Space Strategy

[19] Challenges to Space Security, The Defense Intelligence Agency, January 2019 https://www.dia.mil/Portals/27/Documents/News/Military%20Power%20Publications/Space_Threat_V14_020119_sm.pdf
[20] “Russia’s Behaviour Risks Weaponizing Outer Space” Unal, Beyza and Boulègue, Mathieu, Chatham House, July 27, 2020
[21] Challenges to Space Security
[22] Challenges to Space Security
[23] Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, United Kingdom, July 21, 2020
[24] “Russia’s Behaviour Risks Weaponizing Outer Space”
[25] Challenges to Space Security
[26] Challenges to Space Security
[27] Challenges to Space Security

To see the introduction to this series: Views of the International Game of Space Strategy Part 1: Introduction

China’s journey to become a space power began in 1958, nine months after the Soviet Union Launched Sputnik-1, even though they didn’t launch its first satellite until April 1970. The delay self-imposed by China as they watched the dynamic space race between the Soviet Union and the United States. In the 1980s China began to move their space program with purpose, throwing significant economic and political resources into becoming a space power. [15]

At this time, China is second only to the United States in the number of operational satellites. China has been expanding its Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) program and Anti-Satellite weapons program. In 2007, China tested a kinetic energy anti-satellite interceptor, causing other space powers to re-examine their space strategy. [16]

As Christopher M. Stone, Professor of Space Strategy at Missouri State University’s Graduate Department of Defense and Strategic Studies in Washington, DC. and former Special Assistant to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy at the Pentagon, wrote, “Chinese strategic writings and their continued advancement and deployment of kinetic energy anti-satellite programs highlight the value of the offensive realist perspective as a predictor and assessor of Chinese cost–benefit calculus regarding their counterspace program. People’s Liberation Army (PLA) strategists Li Hechun and Chen Youong stated, ‘Anti-satellite weapons can be developed at low cost and that can strike at the enemy’s enormously expensive yet vulnerable space systems will become an important option… to deter… powerful enemies.’ Chinese strategists have also written that they view the vulnerability of the US critical space infrastructure as ‘soft ribs’ that provide a low threshold option to utilize in crisis or war to shape events to their advantage.” [17]

While China officially advocates the peaceful use of space, and it is pursuing agreements at the United Nations on the non-weaponization of space, it continues to improve its counterspace weapons capabilities and reform its military to integrate cyberspace, space, and EW into joint military operations.

The PLA views space superiority, the ability to control the information sphere, and denying adversaries the same as key components of conducting modern “informatized" wars. China’s PLA watched the American armed forces in the 1991 Gulf War very closely and launched an effort to modernize its weapon systems and update doctrine to place the focus on using and countering adversary information enabled warfare. The PLA also sees counterspace operations as a means to deter and counter a possible U.S. intervention during a regional military conflict. PLA analysis of U.S. and allied military operations states that “destroying or capturing satellites and other sensors” would make it difficult to use precision guided weapons. Moreover, PLA writings suggest that reconnaissance, communications, navigation, and early warning satellites could be among the targets of attacks designed to “blind and deafen the enemy.” [18]

While China does have a complex web of organizations devoted to space comprised of civil, political, “commercial” and military sectors, the PLA has historically managed and invested in China’s space program. With this and the knowledge of China’s space and counterspace emphasis, the idea of China’s future concept of a “civilian” moon base is seen by western powers as a violation of international treaties on use of the moon for military purposes.

Next week: Views of the International Game of Space Strategy Part 3: Russia's Space Strategy


[15] Challenges to Space Security, The Defense Intelligence Agency, January 2019 https://www.dia.mil/Portals/27/Documents/News/Military%20Power%20Publications/Space_Threat_V14_020119_sm.pdf
[16] A review of space strategy worldviews (part 1): 2011 National Security Space Strategy, Stone Christopher M. , The Space Review January 18, 2021 https://thespacereview.com/article/4106/1
[17] A review of space strategy worldviews (part 1): 2011 National Security Space Strategy
[18] Challenges to Space Security

While many people dream that space would be shared peacefully between the nations of Earth, the twenty first century has shown that space born warfare is an expected event and poses a challenge to modern nations and alliances. Space, with all its inherent dangers, has become the new level in the three-dimensional game of chess—a game of state rights of self-defense and deterrence. Any fan of science fiction could point out that these events have been anticipated at least since rockets took us into space and was likely seriously considered even before that. How many novels, short stories, movies, and television shows feature death reigning down from satellites in orbit? While conventional and nuclear weapons launched from space platforms are and have been a possibility for decades, they aren’t the only kinds of weapons that can be used. To understand the strategies in play today and where they may go in the future, it is necessary to examine the chess pieces that can and would be used in space warfare.

What national and international issues are in play when it comes to space and space warfare? For the purpose of this discussion, we will look at Earth Orbit only with an eye to the Moon and Luna Orbit. Nations and international organizations have satellites in space for:

• Research: These include the International Space Station, the various space telescopes, and space missions that include medical and other scientific experiments [1].
• Communications: voice communications, television broadcast, broadband internet, mobile services and data transfer [2].
• Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR): ISR satellites support civil, commercial, and military purposes. Civil and commercial ISR satellites provide remote sensing data, which includes data on the Earth’s land, sea, and atmosphere. ISR satellites support a variety of military activities by providing signals intelligence, warning (including of ballistic missile activity), battle damage assessments, and military force disposition [3].
• Missile Warning: Missile warning uses space-based and terrestrial sensors to notify countries of missile attacks and can enable defensive or offensive operations in response. Space-based sensors usually provide the first indication of a launch and ground-based radars provide follow-on information and confirm the attack [4].
• Positioning, Navigation, and Timing (PNT): Satellite navigation constellations provide PNT data that enable civilian, commercial, and military users to determine their precise location and local time. The European Union, Russia, and the United States’ satellite navigation constellations offer global coverage, and Japan and India operate regional systems. China operates both a regional and worldwide satellite navigation system [5].
• Satellite Command and Control (C2) Architecture: The satellite C2 architecture is how users control and communicate with satellites. The control center uses the uplink to the spacecraft to deliver com-mands. The spacecraft downlink is how data is sent from the spacecraft to a ground station that has the necessary antennas, transmitters, and receivers to receive the data. Some satellite constellations use relay satellites, which enable communication between satellites outside the reception area of a ground station. Any component of the architecture is vulnerable to attack, ranging from physical vulnerabilities of a ground site to electronic warfare (EW) disrupting the connection between the space segment and the operator [6].
• Space Launch: Space launch is the ability to deliver payloads into space. Space launch vehicles (SLV) can deploy, sustain, augment, or reconstitute satellite constellations in support of military, civilian, or commercial customers [7].

The denial of the use of space (counterspace) and attacks to ground based civil and military installations or individuals come from the following space denial assets:

• Cyberspace Threats: Cyberspace pervades all other warfighting domains, including space, and many space operations depend on cyberspace and vice versa. With sophisticated knowledge of satellite C2 and data distribution networks, actors can use offensive cyberspace capabilities to enable a range of reversible to nonreversible effects against space systems, associated ground infrastructure, users, and the links connecting them [8].
• Directed Energy Weapons (DEW): DEW use directed energy to disrupt, damage, or destroy enemy equipment and facilities. These weapons, which can have effects ranging from temporary to permanent, include lasers, high-power microwaves, and other types of radiofrequency weapons. It can be difficult to attribute the origin of a DEW attack, depending on the type [9].
• Electronic Warfare: EW includes using jamming and spoofing techniques to control the electromagnetic spectrum. EW can be challenging to attribute and distinguish from unintentional interference. Uplink jamming is directed toward the satellite and impairs services for all users in the satellite reception area. Downlink jamming has a localized effect because it is directed at ground users, such as a ground forces unit using satellite navigation to determine their location. Spoofing deceives the receiver by introducing a fake signal with erroneous information [10].
• Kinetic Energy Threats: Kinetic energy threats, or antisatellite (ASAT) missiles, are designed to destroy satellites without placing the weapon system or any of its components into orbit. These systems typically consist of a fixed or mobile launch system, a missile, and a kinetic kill vehicle. These weapons could also be launched from aircraft. Once released, the kinetic kill vehicle uses an onboard seeker to intercept the target satellite. Ground-based ASAT missile attacks are more easily attributed than some other counterspace weapons, such as DEW, and their effects can create orbital debris. Orbital Threats: Orbital or space-based systems are satellites that can deliver temporary or permanent effects against other spacecraft. These systems could include payloads such as kinetic kill vehicles, radiofrequency jammers, lasers, chemical sprayers, high-power microwaves, and robotic mechanisms. Some of these systems, such as robotic technology for satellite servicing and repair and debris removal, have peaceful uses but can also be used for military purposes [11].
• Kinetic Energy Threats: Kinetic energy threats, or antisatellite (ASAT) missiles, are designed to destroy satellites without placing the weapon system or any of its components into orbit. These systems typically consist of a fixed or mobile launch system, a missile, and a kinetic kill vehicle. These weapons could also be launched from aircraft. Once released, the kinetic kill vehicle uses an onboard seeker to intercept the target satellite. Ground-based ASAT missile attacks are more easily attributed than some other counterspace weapons, such as DEW, and their effects can create orbital debris [12].
• Orbital Threats: Orbital or space-based systems are satellites that can deliver temporary or permanent effects against other spacecraft. These systems could include payloads such as kinetic kill vehicles, radio frequency jammers, lasers, chemical sprayers, high-power microwaves, and robotic mechanisms. Some of these systems, such as robotic technology for satellite servicing and repair and debris removal, have peaceful uses but can also be used for military purposes [13].
• Space Situational Awareness (SSA): SSA is having current knowledge of a space object’s location and the ability to track and predict its future location; it also incorporates understanding of an actor’s intent for their spacecraft. SSA is necessary for space operations, including the ability to successfully target space objects and assess the effectiveness of an attack. Space object surveillance and identification sensors, which can include telescopes, radars, and space-based sensors, provide the data for SSA [14].

With the chess board pieces laid out, let us now examine the major players in space. For ease of purpose, it will be broken down between China, Russia, India, Japan, Bahrain, Iran, North Korea, the United States and NATO. While the United States is a part of and a leader of NATO, we will keep the two entities separated. Furthermore, we will include the other NATO partners into the NATO strategy. We recognize that we haven’t included every space faring nation-state, but we have included the ones who are shaping space as we know it at this time.

Next week: Views of International Game of Space Strategy Part 2: China

References
[1] Challenges to Space Security, The Defense Intelligence Agency, January 2019 https://www.dia.mil/Portals/27/Documents/News/Military%20Power%20Publications/Space_Threat_V14_020119_sm.pdf
[2] Challenges to Space Security
[3] Challenges to Space Security
[4] Challenges to Space Security
[5] Challenges to Space Security
[6] Challenges to Space Security
[7] Challenges to Space Security
[8] Challenges to Space Security
[9] Challenges to Space Security
[10] Challenges to Space Security
[11] Challenges to Space Security
[12] Challenges to Space Security
[13] Challenges to Space Security
[14] Challenges to Space Security