Views of the International Game of Space Strategy Part 3: Russia's Space Strategy

To see the introduction to this series: Views of the International Game of Space Strategy Part 2: China's Space Strategy

Russia’s space program has long been a platform of its leadership on the international stage. An original pioneer into the space age since its launch of the first artificial satellite, Sputnik-1, and the first person in space, Yuri Gagarian, it became relied upon to send supplies and personnel to the International Space Station for a decade when the United States had stopped launching missions from its own soil. Since its conception, the Russian Space Program is robust, but unlike China’s it is not as well funded and much more focused.

Over the last two decades, Russia has been developing an arsenal of space denial (or counterspace) weapons. These weapons include electronic warfare capabilities “to deny, degrade, and disrupt communications and navigation and [Directed Energy Weapons] to deny the use of space-based imagery.” [19] In late 2019, Russia tested the Kosmos anti-satellite weapon. The Kosmos-2542 carried the smaller satellite Kosmos-2543 sub-satellite, like a matryoshka doll, which reportedly has buzzed Low Earth Orbit US spy satellites and launched a projectile into orbit at a relative high speed of 500 miles per hour, which has led to concerns about the potential Russian capability to target foreign satellites.[20] Also, Western Intelligence also has reason to believe that Russia has developed ground-based weapons designed to kill satellites. [21]

To understand the space strategy that Russia is pursuing it is important to remember that “[s]imilar to China, Russia supports space arms control agreements to prevent weaponization of space, even as it views space as a warfighting domain.” [22] As we explore the Russian doctrine for space, we need to examine the security threat they pose to Western powers: “The security threat posed by Russia is difficult for the West to manage as, in our view and that of many others, it appears fundamentally nihilistic. Russia seems to see foreign policy as a zero-sum game: any actions it can take which damage the West are fundamentally good for Russia. It is also seemingly fed by paranoia, believing that Western institutions such as NATO and the EU have a far more aggressive posture towards it than they do in reality. There is also a sense that Russia believes that an undemocratic ‘might is right’ world order plays to its strengths, which leads it to seek to undermine the Rules Based International Order – whilst nonetheless benefitting from its membership of international political and economic institutions. Russia’s substantive aims, however, are relatively limited: it wishes to be seen as a resurgent ‘great power’ – in particular, dominating the countries of the former USSR – and to ensure that the privileged position of its leadership clique is not damaged.” [23]

“Russia is not the only state investigating anti-satellite weaponry capabilities. There is a wider trend (e.g. China, India, US) to demonstrate advanced space capabilities with nefarious, if not directly offensive, intent. But, for the past few years, Russia in particular, has been provocative in testing its space weapon capabilities. [I]n April 2020, Russia launched and tested into low orbit the PL-19 Nudol direct-ascent anti-satellite (DA-ASAT) interceptor missile system from the Plesetsk Cosmodrome demonstrating its space assets with potential offensive capabilities, in particular, Russia’s capacity to destroy satellites in Low Earth Orbit.

“In addition, the satellites, Kosmos-2535 and Kosmos-2536, launched in July 2019, are also suspected to be operating beyond their official mission of studying Russian orbital assets. It is reported that these satellites conducted a close proximity activity, coming within one kilometer from each other, which led to the creation of orbital debris.” [24]

Russian Military thinkers and strategist believe that the importance of space will continue to expand and be a warfighting domain where achieving supremacy will be a decisive factor in winning future conflicts. In accordance, Russia is seeking to lead in the growing role of precision weapons and information networks in all types of conflicts. At the same time, Russia’s international political “chess moves” have been to express concern over the weaponization of space and purse binding space arms control agreements to box in what it sees as the US weaponization of outer space. All of these maneuvers are to strike what it sees as the United States “chink in their armor”, the reliance of the United States on space.

In pursuit of its space and counterspace strategy, Moscow reorganized its military and civilian space programs in 2015. It created the “Aerospace Forces by merging the former Air Force and Aero-space Defense Troops. This new force includes Russia’s space forces, who have the mission to conduct space launches and maintain the ballistic missile early warning system, the satellite control network, and the space surveillance network. The defense minister stated the change was “prompted by a shift in the center of gravity... towards the aerospace sphere” and as a counter to the U.S. Prompt Global Strike doctrine.” [25] In the process, Russia has reorganized its civil space program to correct inefficiencies across its space industry and to place that space industry almost exclusively into the ownership of the State.

With this reorganization, Russia is updating and improving its space launch capabilities to enhance reliability, alleviate environmental concerns, increase manufacturing efficiencies, and support future human spaceflight and deep-space exploration missions, [26] including the upgrading of the rocket lift capabilities. It is also looking to enhance its satellite communication system, which is essential not only to its civilian communication capabilities but also its military communication capabilities. Russia lags behind China and the United States in the number of satellites, but its high-resolution imagery, navigation, ballistic missile early warning, electronic intelligence satellites have a higher capability than China’s. [27] Currently, according to Western Intelligence agencies, Russia’s counterspace capabilities include:

• “Space Situational Awareness: Russia’s space surveillance network, composed of a variety of telescopes, radars, and other sensors, is capable of searching for, tracking, and characterizing satellites in all Earth orbits. This network allows Russia to support missions including intelligence collection, counterspace targeting, spaceflight safety, satellite anomaly resolution, and space debris monitoring. Some of these sensors also perform a ballistic missile early warning function.
• “Electronic Warfare: The Russian military views EW as an essential tool for gaining and maintaining information superiority over its adversaries, allowing Russia to seize the operational initiative by disrupting adversary command, control, communications, and intelligence capabilities. Russia has fielded a wide range of ground-based EW systems to counter GPS, tactical communications, satellite communications, and radars. Mobile jammers include radar jammers and SATCOM jammers. Russia has aspirations to develop and field a full spectrum of EW capabilities to counter Western C4ISR and weapons guidance systems with new technology, data transfer, and capabilities for peacetime and wartime use by 2020.
• “Directed Energy Weapons. Russia likely is pursuing laser weapons to disrupt, degrade, or dam-age satellites and their sensors. Prior to July 2018, Russia began delivering a laser weapon system to the Aerospace Forces that likely is intended for an ASAT mission. In public statements, Pres-ident Vladimir Putin called it a ‘new type of strategic weapon,’ and the Russian Defense Ministry asserted that it is capable of ‘fighting satellites in orbit.’ Russia is also developing an air-borne ASAT laser weapon system to use against space-based missile defense sensors.
• “Cyberspace Threats: Since at least 2010, the Russian military has prioritized the development of forces and capabilities, including cyberspace operations, for what it terms “information confrontation,” which is a holistic concept for ensuring information superiority. The weaponization of information is a key aspect of this strategy and is employed in times of peace, crisis, and war. Russia considers the information sphere to be strategically decisive and has taken steps to modernize its military’s information attack and defense organizations and capabilities.216
• “Orbital Threats: Russia continues to research and develop sophisticated on-orbit capabilities that could serve dual-use purposes. For example, inspection and servicing satellites can be capable of closely approaching satellites to inspect and potentially fix issues causing malfunctions; this same technology could also be used to approach another country’s satellite and conduct an attack that results in temporary or permanent damage. In 2017, Russia deployed what it described as an ‘inspector satellite capable of diagnosing the technical condition of a Russian satellite from the closest possible distance’; however, its behavior is inconsistent with on-orbit inspection activities or space situational awareness capabilities.
• “Ground-based Kinetic Energy Threats: Russia likely is developing a ground-based, mobile missile system capable of destroying space targets in LEO and ballistic missiles. This weapon system is likely to be operational within the next several years.” [28]

Next week we will continue to review various national space strategies by examining India’s Space Strategy

[19] Challenges to Space Security, The Defense Intelligence Agency, January 2019 https://www.dia.mil/Portals/27/Documents/News/Military%20Power%20Publications/Space_Threat_V14_020119_sm.pdf
[20] “Russia’s Behaviour Risks Weaponizing Outer Space” Unal, Beyza and Boulègue, Mathieu, Chatham House, July 27, 2020
[21] Challenges to Space Security
[22] Challenges to Space Security
[23] Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, United Kingdom, July 21, 2020
[24] “Russia’s Behaviour Risks Weaponizing Outer Space”
[25] Challenges to Space Security
[26] Challenges to Space Security
[27] Challenges to Space Security