Views of the International Game of Space Strategy Part 4: India's Space Strategy

Since the birth of the modern Republic of India, its future has always faced two paths: greatness or collapse. Recently, seventy-one years after its conception, modern India has been following the path of greatness and has been stepping on to the stage as a power in the East alongside of China and Japan and as a new world power. Along with its growing station in the world is a growing national ambition that includes its space program and space strategy.

India’s space ambitions over the years have been guided by the vision of India’s space program founder, Vikram Sarabhai. He stated that vision as “There are some who question the relevance of space activities in a developing nation. To us, there is no ambiguity of purpose. We do not have the fantasy of competing with the exploration of the moon or planets of manned space-flight. But we are convinced that if we are to play a meaningful role nationally, and in the community of nations, we must be second to none in the application of advanced technologies to the real problems of man and society.” [28]

“Space is used extensively in India’s social and development sector, with at least 60 departments using space services to pursue the country’s development agenda. Space technology can affect the most fundamental change in the ground rules of economic competitiveness and development. Space technology applications have served national development well. India’s space program is self-reliant and has also been providing launch services to foreign countries. India is now capable of placing four tonnes in orbit. India has achieved self-reliance in launch vehicles and satellite technology. Furthermore, there is immense potential of lunar resources for energy generation and the possibility of lunar bases, which is also beginning to see competitive attempts in Asia and in other regions. Space-related assets are exceptionally useful for military purposes. For example, ballistic missile defense cannot function without space assets providing communications and navigation. Apart from these, disaster management and tackling natural calamities are also important applications of space assets. India’s space policy should also energize competitive industries to participate in domestic and global markets with increased entrepreneurship in launch vehicles and satellite manufacturing segments. At the same time, efforts must be made to clean up space debris, which is already a huge challenge to keeping space safe, secure, and sustainable. Space assets need to be protected for supporting civil space functions and national security objectives.” [29]

But, in recent years there has been a shift in this ambition. In 2013, the Indian Navy launched its first dedicated military satellite GSAT-7. This launch created an independence of the Indian Navy away from Inmarsat which had provided communication services to its ships. [30]

GSAT-6, another dedicated military satellite, was launched in August 2015, to provide secure and quality communication its military. India further reinforced its military communication ability with the launch of GSAT-7A in December 2018. In April 2019, India launched EMISAT (Electro-Magnetic Intelligence Satellite) which was jointly developed by Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) and the Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO) in an effort to strengthen the military’s ability to intercept enemy radars by detecting the electromagnetic rays they emit. In addition to dedicated military satellites, the Indian military uses a number of dual-use satellites. [31]

The Indian Armed Forces have also been making institutional changes allowing them “to make better and efficient utilization of space in their military operations. In June 2010, Indian Defense Minister AK Anthony announced the establishment of Integrated Space Cell, under the Integrated Defense Services Headquarters of the Ministry of Defense. The Space Cell, jointly operated by the three services of the Indian military and the civilian institutions such as the Department of Space and ISRO, is meant to bring about better integration between these different agencies and evolve a more effective way of utilizing space for military purposes. The Cell is also supposed to review and assess possible threats to Indian space assets.” [32]

In March 2019, India announced and approved budget for a manned space mission in 2022. But the most controversial change occurred in March 2019, India conducted its first anti-satellite test. Code-named Mission Shakti, the anti-satellite interceptor ballistic missile destroyed a live Indian satellite in low Earth Orbit. [33] [34] This step has been taken in response to the growing Chinese economic and hard power capabilities in outer space, which they see as a direct threat to India’s national security. [35]

“Today the imperatives behind the Indian space program have evolved. Like many other countries, India is compelled to use space for a number of military requirements such as for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance. India is turning to space to gain operational and informational advantages. Space is the fourth dimension of warfare other than sea, air, and land. Nations are increasingly reorienting militaries to exploit the space domain.
“Space has several applications. Satellite communications, satellite imagery and reconnaissance, and satellite navigation perform numerous functions. For instance, satellite imagery enables damage assessment following an air strike and satellite navigation guides precision missiles to their targets. The global debate has moved from utilization of space for military purposes towards one of weaponizing outer space.

“China’s space program is militarily oriented and controlled by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). In 2015, China undertook major institutional reforms and created the PLA Strategic Support Force (PLASSF), integrating cyber, electronic, and space capabilities into a single unified service. With the support of its space assets, China has created a potent Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR). These measures are the result of China identifying space as the new strategic high ground. The establishment of the PLASSF is indicative of Beijing’s intention to exploit space as a pivotal asset for the conduct of military operations.

“India is confronted with a range of national security threats including proxy wars perpetrated by inimical neighbors, domestic insurgencies, left-wing extremism, natural disasters, and dangers along the Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs). Space will play a critical role for India in addressing these threats. Given the sheer geographic spread of India’s defense forces, space will be vital in helping them meet the threats the country faces. Space is vital for sustaining communications, logistics, missiles launch and guidance, weapons systems, and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) across the Indian Armed Forces.

“At the same time, opportunities for developing a space nexus also exist in India’s neighborhood. Pakistan is seen as a proxy space power of China.  Military collusion between the two will extend to increasing battlefield awareness and transparency, assist in acquiring precision coordinates, and prioritizing targets. China’s Anti-Satellite test (ASAT) in January 2007 demonstrated the intent behind China’s moves to acquire a potent space weapons capability.  India conducted its own ASAT test on 27 March 2019 but as mentioned earlier, New Delhi could not have ignored the trends of space weaponization including in the Indian neighborhood.” [36]

The shifts above and the continued direction of Inda’s space program and space strategy are being driven, as Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan wrote, “are genuine security-driven considerations for India and other Asian powers in shaping their space programs. Outer space is becoming an extension of the terrestrial geopolitical competition, with all participating.” [37] There is a techno-nationalism growing in Asia based on prestige and economic potential through space exploration and economic leverage through space denial which threatens the future of Asia and the International Community.

[28] “Critical Shifts in India’s Outer Space Policy”, Goswami, Namrata and Garretson, Peter. The Diplomat, April 16, 2019
[29] “India in the final frontier: Strategy, policy and industry”, Rajagopalan, Rajeswari Pillai, Mohan, Pulkit, and Krishna, Rahul, Observer Research Foundation, This special report is a by-product of the discussions and deliberations that took place at the 5th ORF Kalpana Chawla Annual Space Policy Dialogue. The dialogue took place from 29 April to 1 May 2019 in New Delhi.
[30]“India Space Strategy: Geopolitics is the Driver”, Rajagopalan, Rajeswari Pillai, Italian Institute for International Political Studies, December 11, 2020.
[31] “India Space Strategy: Geopolitics is the Driver”
[32] “India Space Strategy: Geopolitics is the Driver”
[33] “Critical Shifts in India’s Outer Space Policy”
[34] “India in the final frontier: Strategy, policy and industry”
[35] “India Space Strategy: Geopolitics is the Driver”
[36] “India in the final frontier: Strategy, policy and industry”
[37] “India Space Strategy: Geopolitics is the Driver”